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Abstract: In spite of rapid economic growth and swift structural change during the last two
decades, China’s industrial reform is far from complete, especially with regard to state
enterprises (SOEs). Although troubled with huge financial losses, heavy debt, and substantial
over-staffing, SOEs will continue to play a crucial part in the government policy to maintain
social stability and economic growth in China. This study, based on samples of about 700
state enterprises during 1980-94, investigates productivity performance of the SOEs using
Data Envelopment Analysis and Malmquist Index. Our empirical results show that average
technical efficiency had been low among the sample SOEs. Considerable productivity growth
was found, but it was mainly accomplished through technical progress rather than efficiency
improvement.  Regression analyses indicate that wage incentives and education had positive
impacts on productivity growth, while large scale was an important determinant of whether
an SOE was applying best practice technology. It is also shown that large SOEs were more
likely to generate technical progress. These findings are consistent with the industrial
structural adjustment program initiated by the government in 1994, which has focused on
improving productive efficiency via redundancies and technology upgrading, and on building
its best SOEs into conglomerates.
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1. Introduction
Since economic reforms were initiated in the late 1970s, an important feature of
China’s economic growth is its reliance on productivity growth. In recent years, in order to
further boost productivity and sustain economic growth, China's State Planning Commission
issued a set of general guidelines for restructuring the economy and accelerating development
of key industries. These guidelines emphasize the importance of promoting large state
enterprises (SOEs) and enterprise groups, and improving productive efficiency via
redundancies and technology upgrading.
Contrary to what has been commonly perceived, some recent studies argue that
China’s large SOEs are not stagnant fossils waiting to die. Under economic reform policies
this sector has undergone large change due to enhanced enterprise autonomy, the impact of
market forces, rapid growth of domestic demand for upstream products, strategic integration
with the world economy and the state’s policy to promote large businesses (Nolan and Wang,
1999). In conjunction with the non-state sector, large-scale enterprises have been an
important engine for growth over an extended period in China (Smyth, 2000). These studies
present a challenge to the “transitional orthodoxy,” namely that only privatization can solve
the industrial problems of communist countries. At the center of this debate, is the issue of
the productivity performance of SOEs, especially large SOEs. However, due to the lack of
empirical studies in the literature, this issue deserves further investigations using
comprehensive enterprise level data.
A number of empirical studies have attempted to measure the total factor productivity
(TFP) growth for the Chinese state-owned sector as a whole. Although some have found that
economic reform has made little or no contribution to TFP growth in the state sector, most
have found that TFP growth in SOEs has improved since 1978, while lagging behind the
township and village enterprises (Smyth, 2000). However, there are few studies, which
distinguish large-scale SOEs from SOEs as a whole. Lo (1999) is the only study that
explicitly compares TFP growth in large and medium state enterprises (LMEs), SOEs as a
whole, and collective enterprises (COEs). He estimates a Cobb-Douglas production function
using aggregate data for 1980-95. One important finding in his study is that in terms of
productivity growth COEs performed better than both SOEs and LMEs, but LMEs performed
much  better  than  SOEs  as  a  whole. In this paper, as a further effort to the study on the
performance of SOEs, we investigate the productivity characteristics of best practice SOEs
with special emphasis on large enterprises.
Most previous productivity studies of the SOE sector have been concentrating on3
average productivity growth and a considerable portion of the literature has used
conventional methodologies such as Cobb-Douglas production function estimations.
Although studies using modern approaches including stochastic and deterministic frontier
production function estimations have been increasing, none of the studies has focused on best
practice SOEs. An investigation of best practice SOEs, especially the identification and
characterization of those with substantial efficiency improvement and technical progress, will
improve understanding of the determinants of productivity growth in the state industrial
sector, and on the perspective of forming large enterprise groups (conglomerates) with the
best practice SOEs at the core.
On the basis of a panel data from about 700 state enterprises for the period 1980-94,
this study uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist index to evaluate
productivity performance of SOEs. Total factor productivity (TFP) growth is decomposed
into efficiency improvement and technical progress. Production frontiers are estimated for
each of the two-digit industries in our sample using disaggregated employment and material
data. The best practice SOEs are thus identified. With these methodologies, the determinants
of best practice SOEs and productivity growth are analyzed by using regression techniques
for limited dependent variable models with random effects. The plan of the paper is as
follows. In Section 2, we present the background of our study. In Section 3, we briefly
discuss previous studies in the literature, and introduce the methodologies used in this study.
Data is presented in Section 4. Section 5 reports and analyzes empirical results, and Section 6
concludes the study.
2. Background
In spite of rapid economic growth and swift structural change during the last two
decades, China’s industrial reform is far from complete, especially with regard to SOEs. For
the time being, SOEs are still of great importance in terms of urban employment and total
investment in industrial fixed assets, while their share of industrial output has been steadily
declining.
1 In the foreseeable future, state enterprises will continue to be replaced by non-
state firms in terms of employment creation, given the recent government policy to “grasp the
large, release the small.”
2 Although most SOEs have been troubled with huge financial losses,
heavy debts, and substantial over-staffing, it is the government’s ambition that state
enterprises shall play a crucial part in maintaining social stability and sustained economic
growth in China. In order to revitalise the state industrial sector, the structural adjustment
program initiated by the government in 1994 has focused on improving productive efficiency4
via redundancies and technology upgrading, and on building its best SOEs into
conglomerates (the establishment of the modern enterprise system).
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Among Chinese economists, industrial policy has long been a topic for controversy.
Those who oppose such policies suggest that state ownership should be eliminated from all
areas of industrial production but a few sectors such as transportation and telecommunication.
After the breakout of South East Asia financial crisis, more doubts have been cast on the
appropriateness of developing Japanese and South Korean style conglomerates in China. For
ideological reasons, among other things, the government is in favour of state ownership at
least in some major industrial sectors. Recent changes in the international political
environment (e.g., Kosovo crisis) and China’s forthcoming entry into the World Trade
Organisation have intensified the debate among Chinese economists and policy analysts on
the role of state enterprises in the context of sustainable growth, economic security, and
political stability (e.g., Wang, 2000).
The unsatisfactory financial performance of most SOEs is not really an issue in
dispute. Some economists argue, however, that thanks to the management reforms carried out
since the late 1970s and early 1980s the fundamentals of some SOEs have been improved
with respect to efficiency and technology. The increasing losses in SOEs since the early
1990s were, in their view, mainly due to the unfavorable external environment such as
intense and sometimes “unfair” competitions from township and village enterprises, and joint
ventures. Heavy social responsibilities (e.g., pension, housing, and over-staffing) were also
blamed for their poor performance (Lin and Tan, 1999). It is thus not difficult to understand
the recent focus of the government’s structural adjustment program on the introduction of the
modern enterprise system, reduction of over-staffing, and technology upgrading. These
measures have been accompanied by housing, pension, and other welfare reforms, which
were expected to reduce enterprise burdens. The emphasis on the modern enterprise system
reflects the long-standing view of some economists that SOEs are basically reformable if
effective management methods can be implemented, while reduction of over-staffing and
technology upgrading were directly aiming at boosting productivity growth in SOEs.
In this study, we take up two issues concerning the productivity performance of SOEs
during the period of economic reforms: improvement in technical efficiency and technical
progress in SOEs in general, and the behavior of best practice SOEs in particular.
Improvement in technical efficiency is one of the fundamental aspects of Chinese enterprise
reforms, because various incentive schemes intended to improve management efficiency have
been introduced or experimented with at various stages of the reform process since the late5
1970s. An empirical evaluation would provide evidence as to the effectiveness of
management reforms in SOEs. Since the early stage of the enterprise reform, tremendous
efforts have been made to upgrade technologies of SOEs. Considerable investments in
relatively advanced technologies from Western countries took place in forms of direct
purchases, technology transfers, and joint ventures. Whether SOEs are to maintain their status
as engines of economic growth into the 21st century, depends to a large extent on their ability
to adapt new technologies. However, the situation in terms of technical progress may differ
from one SOE to the other, given their diverse performance. A closer look at the best practice
SOEs, especially those with substantial technical progress, may shed some light on the
determinants of productivity growth in the state industrial sector, and on the perspective of
forming conglomerates with the best practice SOEs as the core.
3. Methodology
In comparison with productivity studies using aggregate time series data, there have
been fewer such studies in which enterprise level data are used.
4  Productivity outcomes
depend on many factors. Trends in total factor productivity (TFP) reflect the efficacy of
reform policy, enterprise response to changes in competition and other aspects of market
structure, learning effects, and the benefits of new equipment, technical know-how, and
organizational skills, as well as the impact of social, political, or institutional obstacles to
potentially fruitful innovations. It is thus difficult to ascertain the cause of productivity
movements since changes in aggregate productivity conceal a rich variety of microeconomic
behavior (Jefferson et. al, 1996). Therefore, there is a need for more productivity studies at
lower levels of aggregation for selected industries, in which higher rate of efficiency
improvement and technical progress are expected.
Although most studies on Chinese productivity have used the traditional method of
average production function estimations, studies using modern approaches such as stochastic
and deterministic frontier production function estimations have been increasing. For instance,
Lau and Brada (1990) estimated a parametric deterministic frontier production function using
aggregate industrial time series data from 1953-1985; Zheng, Liu, and Bigsten (1998)
compared the difference in technical efficiency between state-owned enterprises and
township-village enterprises by conducting data envelopment analysis (DEA) for the period
1986-90; a comparative static DEA model (the Malmquist index method) was applied to
Chinese state enterprise data from 1980, 1984, and 1985 in Färe et. al (1996); Liu and Zheng
(1998) studied determinants of technical efficiency in Chinese state enterprises during 1985-6
1994 by using a two-step procedure in the estimation of stochastic production frontiers; and
Wu (1995)  employed a stochastic frontier panel data model proposed by Cornwell et al.
(1990) to examine total factor productivity growth, technological progress, and technical
efficiency change using Chinese provincial data for 1985-1991.
In this study, we are interested in searching for micro evidence as to whether there
had been TFP growths at a well-defined industrial level in the state sector, by employing a
DEA-based Malmquist index method, which has not often been used on Chinese data. The
Malmquist index is a type of quantity indexes constructed as ratios of distance functions
(Caves et al. 1982a and 1982b). Since distance functions are not accessible to the general
reader in terms of notation, we adopt here a notation system based on technical efficiency
measures defined in Førsund and Hjalmarsson (1979).
In Figure 1, x stands for input and y for output. Assuming that one has input and




2) are observations from year 1 and year 2.
Two production frontiers with constant returns to scale (CRS) are drawn as lines 01 for the
first year and 02 for the second year. The first year’s frontier is constructed using the first
year’s input and output observations and the second year’s frontier using the second year’s
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Figure 1 Output Increasing Technical Efficiency and the Output Oriented Malmquist
Productivity Index.7
observations. Observations on the constructed frontiers are, in the literature, referred to as
best practice production units, or best practice. By following Førsund and Hjalmarsson
(1979), the output increasing technical efficiency under CRS, E3, for an enterprise in year 1
is defined as the ratio of observed output (0f) to the output level predicted (0e) by that year’s
production frontier (01), which can be written as
5
E311=0f/0e
while the output increasing technical efficiency for the enterprise in year 1 against the second
year’s production frontier (02) is
E321=0f/0b
where the first subscript refers to the frontier upon which the observations (represented by the
second subscript) are evaluated in terms of technical efficiency. E322 and E312 are also
similarly defined. The value of E311 and E322, by definition, goes between 0 and 1. A value of
unity for E311, for instance, means that the production unit is 100% efficient technically,
while a value of 0.5 implies that the production unit achieves only 50% technical efficiency.
E12 may assume a value that exceeds unity in case of technical progress, because production
units in year 2 may produce above the production frontier for year 1 as with the observation
(x
2,y
2) in Figure 1. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS), with reference to
Figure 1, the output-oriented Malmquist productivity index can be defined
 as the geometric mean of the first and second period indices as
Using technical efficiency notation, it is equivalent to
Mo=[(E322/E321)≅ (E312/E311)]
½
This definition is from Färe et al. (1994), but the notations for distance function are replaced
by technical efficiency measures. A direct interpretation of Mo is that productivity
improvement can be measured as the ratio of the second year’s technical efficiency to the
first year’s. However, since the frontier chosen for the measurement of technical efficiency























taken as a compromise. The Malmquist productivity index, Mo, can be multiplicatively







where MC=E322/E311, and MF=[(E312/E322)≅ (E311/E321)]
½. MC is the ratio of technical
efficiency evaluated using observations from year 2 (E322) to the efficiency evaluated using
observations only from year 1. It measures the improvement in technical efficiency between
the two years (catching-up effect). MF is the geometric mean of the frontier shift based on
observations from both years, which is interpreted as technical change. Values of Mo, MC,
and MF, which exceed unity, stand for improvement in total factor productivity, technical
efficiency, and technical progress, while values that are less than unity mean the opposite.
In order to calculate the productivity of enterprise k’ between 1 and 2, we need to
solve four different linear-programming problems: E312, E322, E311, and E321. For each
k’=1,...,K,
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The computation of E22 is exactly like the above, where 2 is substituted for subscript 1.
Two of the distance functions used to construct the Malmquist index require
information from two periods. The first of these is computed for observation k’ as,9
() Exy
yz y m M

















































                      
                  
                           
In empirical applications, the above formulations may produce results of technical regress,
which are usually difficult to interpret. In order to avoid such results, in this study,
restrictions will be imposed by including best practice observations from the first year when
the second year’s frontier is generated.
4. Data
The data used for empirical estimation come from two enterprise surveys conducted
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 1990 and 1996. The first survey,
which  has been used in Groves et al. (1994, 1995) and Li (1997), contains annual data from
769 state-owned enterprises between 1980 and 1989. The second survey includes mostly the
same SOEs between 1990 and 1994. More than 300 variables are covered in the data,
including details of enterprises’ real and financial accounts, price information, and internal
incentives. The sample enterprises represent 36 two-digit industries in mining, logging,
utilities, and manufacturing and are located in four provinces (Jiangsu, Jilin, Shanxi, and
Sichuan).
A. Output, Inputs, and their Deflator
When dealing with a panel data set as comprehensive as ours, the value-added output
measure together with capital and total employment have been commonly used in practice.
Because this type of data covers different industrial sectors, using value-added plus capital
and total employment to estimate a value-added production function would make
observations across industries more comparable. Another convention in this line of research
is to use gross output plus capital, employment, and intermediate input in the estimation of
production functions. However, this method would make the cross industrial observations
less comparable, since the material used in one industry may not be used in another industry.
In this study, we take another approach to overcome the comparability problem with
this type of data. We assume that each sector has its own production function. The benefit of
this is that comparisons, for instance with regard to technical efficiency, are made after10
production functions for individual industries have been estimated. Another advantage is that
disaggregation of inputs other than labor and capital becomes more reasonable. For one thing,
materials within each industry are more comparable. For another, energy usage is also for
more or less similar purposes within an industry.
To approximate the production technology in individual industries as precisely as
possible, disaggregated labor inputs of production workers, technicians, and management
personnel were chosen from the data. For intermediate inputs, annual costs of material,
electricity, coal, and oil can be found as well. Because the cost shares of coal and oil in the
total cost of non-labor inputs are negligible, coal and oil were later excluded from our
analysis. The deflator for material was constructed using the annual percentage increase in
material price reported in the data, and the deflator for electricity was found in the Statistical
Yearbook of China. Capital  was measured as total net fixed assets for production purpose in
fixed prices. The capital deflator came from the Statistical Yearbook of China.
Output is measured as gross output at fixed price (1980 price), which was reported
directly in the data. Using 1980 prices as a base to convert output of later years into a
comparable measure has been a controversial issue in the Chinese enterprise studies. In Li
(1997), 1990 market price deflators were constructed in order to reflect the real value of
output produced in SOEs. However, according to the Chinese practice, for comparison
purpose, SOEs have simply been required to report their gross output value by multiplying
the quantity of their output with a fixed price issued by the statistical authorities. Since the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, there have been only five fixed prices
issued by the government in 1952, 1957, 1970, 1980, and 1990 (SSB, 1993, page 16). On the
other hand, gross output in current prices may consist of values calculated using both market
and planned prices. Therefore, the price deflator obtained from dividing the gross output at
current prices by the gross output at fixed prices is not a really consistent deflator.
6
B. Reform and Characteristic Variables
There are other variables that might be helpful in identifying the determinants of
technical efficiency and productivity growth. Although productivity is fundamentally
important in the evaluation of enterprise performance, it is only one of the necessary
conditions for a successful firm. Since many SOEs’ financial performance have been far from
satisfactory, it would be interesting to make an assessment on the relationship between
profitability of an enterprise and its productivity performance. We will use annual profit as
our profit variable. As to the impact of incentive schemes on enterprise productivity, several11
variables can be used as far as the data are concerned. Relevant variables involve flexible
wage, retained profits, relative salary of managers to that of workers, etc. Other factors that
affect productivity may include education levels of employees (the proportion of employees
with high school education or higher
7), investment in fixed capital, capacity utilization, age of
the enterprise, and the proportion of non-production workers to the total.
We are also particularly interested in the two characteristic variables: scale and
administrative levels. According to the statistical authority in China, SOEs are classified into
three scale groups: large, medium, and small. SOEs are supervised at different levels of
government (central, province, region, and county). Centrally administered SOEs are usually
large and county managed ones are usually small. Depending on number of observations
available for each two-digit industry, 17 two-digit industries were chosen for analysis:
(1)   Coal Industry
(5)   Construction Materials and Other Non-Metal Mining
(10) Food Manufacturing
(14) Textile Industry
(16) Animal Skin Product Manufacturing




(29) Rubber Product Manufacturing
(31) Construction Materials and Other Non-Metal Mine Products
(32) Black Metal Production and Processing
(35) Machinery Industry
(36) Communication and Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
(37) Electrical Machinery and Material Manufacturing
(38) Electronics and Communication Equipment Manufacturing
(39) Industrial Instrument and Measurement Equipment Manufacturing
The numbers are industry classification codes from the Chinese statistical authorities.
5. Empirical Results
17 two-digit industries are chosen for empirical estimations. Those industries that
were left out have too few observations (less than four). Although deterministic frontier
methods such as DEA usually require much less observations than stochastic frontier12
methods, lack of cross-section observations for some industries in our data does have a
negative effect on estimation results. For instance, when there are only about 10 observations
in each cross-section, average technical efficiencies tend to be unusually high. However, we
expect that this problem would be less severe when it comes to improvement in efficiency
and technical change. In the first part of the section, DEA and Malmquist estimation results
are discussed by industry sector. Regression analyses were also performed on estimated
technical efficiency measures. The results are presented in the second part of the section.
5.1 DEA and Malmquist Index Results
The estimates of E311, Mo, MC, and MF are reported in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4. The
results are presented in four groups. Machinery industry and textiles have a relatively larger
number of cross-section observations, so they were grouped by themselves. For other
industries, they are included either in the group of heavy industries or in that of light
industries. Only a few extreme observations were excluded from the data. The estimation
strategy used in obtaining DEA estimates was to keep as many observations as possible and
detailed data cleaning work was kept to the minimum due to the relatively large size of the
data set. Fortunately, there are only a handful of seemingly too high values for the Malmquist
index and its components, and they were not excluded as outliers (e.g., 9.87 in Table 2). In
one case, the Malmquist index between 1980 and 1994 was too large (49.96 in Table 2), but
this number was not involved in the regression analysis (only between-year index was used).
In Table 1, the lower levels of average efficiency for machinery and textile industries
might be due to their larger cross-section, and the higher levels of average efficiency between
1990-94 can be also attributed to the reduction in the number of observations during the
period. Otherwise, it is consistent with the belief that technical efficiency had been improved
since the early 1990s. There does not seem to be an obvious time trend in technical efficiency
during the entire data period. On the whole, the levels of technical efficiency among SOEs in
China appear to fall in the 50%-80% interval. The higher efficiency level in heavy and light
industries might be attributed to the lack of observations in some industries as mentioned
above.
In Table 5, we calculated the distribution of frontier enterprises (best practice) across
different scales. Small scale seems to have more enterprises producing on their industry
production frontier than others during the data period, but the differences are not large. In
Table 6, enterprises supervised by region government have relatively more frontier
producers. On the other hand, Jiangsu had more best-practice SOEs than other provinces in13
relative terms (Table 7). In all the three tables, otherwise, the distributions of best practice
across scale, administration, and provinces are fairly even. This provides an interesting case
for regression analysis.
As to the results regarding the Malmquist index, productivity growth was seen in all
the sectors, but textile showed productivity decrease in 4 years. The decomposition of
productivity growth into efficiency change and technical progress reveals an interesting
phenomenon. Efficiency improvement was rather rare in all four sectors. Most of the
productivity growth came from technical progress. This can be a distorted picture as far as
Chinese enterprise data are concerned. One scenario is that most enterprises had been
producing well below their production frontier including best practice SOEs. The frontier was
formed through best practice SOEs in our estimation. In the reform process the potential for
the best SOEs to improve technical efficiency was very large. Therefore, as the best SOEs
improve their technical efficiency, they raise the production frontiers. Technical progress was




There are three sets of results for regression analysis. The first is the regression of
DEA efficiency estimates on explanatory variables. For analysis of best practice, we also
created a qualitative variable by setting efficiency scores with values less than unity to zero.
The second is the regression of the Malmquist index and its components on explanatory
variables. Only quantitative dependent variables were used in this case. The third set of
results was obtained by using qualitative dependent variables derived from the Malmquist
index and its components.
The explanatory variables include age of the enterprise, the ratio of flexible wage to
total wage, the share of high school graduates or higher of total employees, capacity
utilization, and dummies for provinces, scale, administration levels, industries, and years.
Explanatory variables that were excluded from our final estimations are: total profits, retained
profits, relative salary of managers to that of workers, investment in fixed capital, and the
proportion of non-production workers to the total. These variables were not statistically
significant in our preliminary estimations and usually had much more missing observations
than those kept in the final estimations.
Regression results on the determinants of technical efficiency are presented in Table
10. Tobit models were used when E3 was the dependent variable, while Probit models were14
employed when E3
* (a 0-1 variable, i.e., 0 for less than 100% efficient and 1 for 100%
efficient enterprises) was the dependent variable. In the case of the Tobit model results, the
random effects model was favoured, whereas the random effects with the Probit model was
not statistically significant. Age, education, and flexible wages all had positive effects on
technical efficiency, with education the highest (0.0886). Medium SOEs were significantly
less efficient than small SOEs. Jiangsu province was definitely the most efficient among the
four provinces of the sample. In the case of the Probit model results, flexible wages and
education had highly significant effects over the probability of producing on the frontier, but
the effect of the age variable became statistically insignificant. Jiangsu came again first in
terms of frontier affects.
As to the influence of administration levels, the random effect model produced
somewhat different result from the ordinary Tobit model. But in both cases, centrally
administrated SOEs were the least efficient. This made a stark contrast with the results of the
Probit model on large scale. According to the Tobit model result on best practice, large scale
increases the probability of being on the production frontier. Less than one-third of large
SOEs are supervised by the central government through industrial ministries. The worst-case
scenario is a medium SOE administered by the central government.
In Table 11, the Malmquist index and its components (efficiency and technical
changes) are used as dependent variables. Explanatory variables (flexible wages, education,
and capacity utilization) in the regression are in first difference, since the Malmquist index
reflects the change in productivity between two years. Random effect models were all
rejected in both the linear and non-linear formulation (i.e. the Tobit model for technical
progress) because the first difference nature of the Malmquist index took away the individual
effects. The regression results are very encouraging: flexible wages and education have a
positive influence on productivity growth as a whole, but the influence was mainly through
improvement in technical efficiency. Capacity utilization became insignificant, perhaps
because of lack of variations in this variable. Jiangsu province is a front-runner in terms of
improvement in technical efficiency as well as technical progress. The years, 1983, 1990, and
1993 had noticeable improvement in productivity. For 1983 and 1993, the improved
productivity seems to come mainly from technical progress.
In Table 12, the dependent variables are 0-1 variables for the Malmquist index, i.e.,
efficiency change (0 for negative or no change and 1 for positive change), and technical
progress (0 for no change and 1 for positive change). Again, flexible wage had a positive
impact on the probability of an enterprise to have a productivity improvement via15
improvement in technical efficiency. Jiangsu province achieved productivity improvements
mainly through technical progress. This result is consistent with the one in Table 11. Another
interesting finding is that large-scale enterprises were more likely to have productivity
improvements, which might be regarded as a confirmation of the government’s strategy of
“grasp the large and release the small.” The high probability of productivity improvement in
large SOEs was driven by investment in new technology. It is also interesting to relate this
finding with that in Table 11: large scale does not guarantee productivity improvement,
although it increases the probability of a breakthrough to growth. Education is not significant
in Table 12.
Overall the decomposition and the regressions provided interesting results. It seems
that explanatory variables can be grouped into two categories. Education and flexible wage
have positive impact on productivity through efficiency improvement, while province and
large scale mainly affect technical progress. Put it another way, physical capital (reflected by
scale, province) affects technical progress, while incentive schemes and human capital are
more important for efficiency improvement (as with flexible wage and education).
On average, the improvement in technical efficiency is far from satisfactory, while
technical progress dominates productivity growth. So, the potential for productivity
improvement in SOEs is large. On the other hand, the best practice SOEs may have played
the role of leaders throughout the data period. As they improved their production efficiency,
it was very difficult for others to catch up. In this case, the average and the best practice
SOEs may simply belong to entirely different categories of producers in terms of technology,
quality of human capital, managerial capacity, and external environment. Therefore, it is not
so unreasonable that the recent government policy encouraged takeovers of less efficient
SOEs by the more efficient ones.
6. Conclusions
In this study, we have investigated the productivity performance of SOEs, using a
relatively large panel. The measured average efficiency levels of SOEs were low (mostly less
than 70%, sometimes around only 50%), when sufficient observations could be used for some
industrial branches. This is consistent with findings in previous studies such as Wu (1993),
Liu and Zheng (1998), and Zheng, Liu, and Bigsten (1998). On average, there had been
productivity growth in the sample SOEs. However, the decomposition shows that the SOE
sector have relied on capital investment rather than on improvement in technical efficiency.
Best practice SOEs seem to be more or less evenly distributed across scales, administrative16
levels, and provinces in the data. However, according to our regression analyses, large scale
was one of the determinants of best practice and technical progress. On the other hand, large
SOEs did not have advantages in terms of average technical efficiency and efficiency
improvement over medium and small SOEs. This implies that even large SOE is not a
homogeneous group with respect to technical efficiency.
Flexible wages and education had significant and positive impacts on technical
efficiency and productivity improvement, and can be considered determinants of best practice
SOEs. However, the effect of education may require more preconditions than that of flexible
wages. Incentive schemes have a significant impact on the direction of efficiency change,
while the effect of education takes place only when the change is positive. Jiangsu province
seems to have succeeded in bringing about some efficiency improvements, instead of relying
solely on investment in new technology. Centrally administrated SOEs were among the least
efficient assuming everything else fixed.
Our empirical findings are not inconsistent with the recent government policy
concerning redundancies, technical up-grading, and the modern enterprise system. These
policy emphases do address the key problems deeply rooted in the SOE sector, i.e., low
efficiency, incompetence, and inability to separate management from state interference. It is
probably fair to say that China’s enterprise reforms have made considerable progress in the
area of productivity growth in the SOE sector since the late 1970s. Particularly, large SOEs
were more able to play the role of best practice firms than medium and small SOEs.
Nevertheless, these achievements are far from satisfactory by international standards. More
drastic reform measures are called for, including complete or partial privatisation. However,
the reform of large SOEs is a more complex task than that of others. When privatisation
appears not to be an option in sectors such as basic, military, and pillar industries, for the
time being, the restructuring program of 1994 seems to be an alternative with less economic
and political risks. Getting rid of policy burdens and the development of the modern
industrial corporate culture are time-consuming and may take years to accomplish. If the
ultimate goal is to privatise most of the large SOEs, privatisation might be more likely to
succeed in the absence of policy burdens and when the modern enterprise system is well
established within the SOE sector. After all, one has to pay due attention to the lessons of the
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union experience, for instance, summarised in Nolan
(1995) and Stiglitz (1999). The big bang solution is not always the most efficient one.17
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Table 1 Technical Efficiency in SOEs (1980-94)
Machinery Industry Textile Industry Heavy Industries Light Industries
Year N Mean Min Std N Mean Min Std N Mean Min Std N Mean Min Std
80 108 0.62 0.13 0.22 64 0.73 0.37 0.16 145 0.71 0.01 0.24 123 0.68 0.05 0.35
81 135 0.57 0.09 0.20 75 0.68 0.35 0.20 181 0.67 0.06 0.28 147 0.74 0.17 0.27
82 138 0.54 0.12 0.21 86 0.67 0.19 0.19 186 0.75 0.06 0.23 154 0.78 0.08 0.23
83 137 0.58 0.20 0.22 89 0.20 0.07 0.16 190 0.76 0.06 0.23 157 0.79 0.05 0.23
84 145 0.56 0.18 0.22 93 0.48 0.12 0.23 196 0.78 0.08 0.21 164 0.78 0.07 0.23
85 142 0.52 0.17 0.21 95 0.49 0.12 0.25 199 0.76 0.06 0.22 170 0.81 0.07 0.21
86 145 0.52 0.16 0.21 94 0.48 0.10 0.28 200 0.76 0.11 0.22 172 0.79 0.06 0.23
87 143 0.53 0.16 0.21 95 0.49 0.08 0.28 201 0.75 0.09 0.22 174 0.69 0.11 0.29
88 143 0.52 0.14 0.20 95 0.49 0.12 0.26 200 0.75 0.12 0.22 173 0.79 0.11 0.22
89 146 0.52 0.12 0.22 95 0.48 0.09 0.27 201 0.76 0.09 0.23 174 0.78 0.20 0.23
90 141 0.68 0.25 0.19 89 0.69 0.26 0.20 177 0.87 0.30 0.16 176 0.86 0.30 0.17
91 142 0.71 0.23 0.20 90 0.71 0.33 0.18 177 0.73 0.15 0.27 177 0.85 0.19 0.18
92 142 0.63 0.18 0.19 90 0.69 0.25 0.20 177 0.84 0.25 0.18 177 0.81 0.26 0.21
93 142 0.59 0.16 0.19 90 0.23 0.04 0.20 177 0.82 0.28 0.20 177 0.78 0.17 0.23
94 142 0.62 0.16 0.21 90 0.66 0.17 0.22 177 0.75 0.18 0.23 177 0.68 0.10 0.30
Table 2 Malmquist Index for SOEs (1980-94)
Machinery Industry Textile Industry Heavy Industries Light Industries
Year Mean Min Max Std Mean Min Max Std Mean Min Max Std Mean Min Max Std
80/81 0.94 0.23 1.60 0.27 1.04 0.76 1.42 0.15 1.04 0.15 7.89 0.70 1.00 0.08 2.37 0.31
81/82 1.14 0.43 4.98 0.50 0.97 0.16 1.40 0.19 1.06 0.61 2.82 0.30 1.08 0.39 2.47 0.26
82/83 1.13 0.50 2.23 0.25 1.29 0.64 8.93 1.13 1.10 0.26 2.34 0.23 1.16 0.38 6.68 0.52
83/84 1.14 0.46 2.28 0.24 1.04 0.15 2.41 0.27 1.06 0.63 3.91 0.27 1.18 0.60 8.66 0.65
84/85 1.11 0.49 2.12 0.21 1.02 0.61 1.64 0.18 1.04 0.19 3.55 0.29 1.10 0.56 2.32 0.25
85/86 1.06 0.51 3.29 0.29 0.98 0.39 2.13 0.24 1.13 0.20 5.72 0.48 1.04 0.52 2.05 0.20
86/87 1.10 0.48 2.73 0.27 1.04 0.36 1.85 0.21 1.06 0.37 2.01 0.20 1.14 0.57 3.56 0.36
87/88 1.11 0.44 2.13 0.24 0.96 0.32 1.79 0.24 1.11 0.60 3.91 0.31 1.17 0.54 5.33 0.50
88/89 1.04 0.30 1.85 0.23 0.93 0.34 1.94 0.24 1.01 0.11 1.71 0.21 1.10 0.51 3.73 0.37
89/90 1.13 0.43 3.38 0.52 1.21 0.22 4.30 0.69 1.14 0.42 4.46 0.56 1.20 0.56 3.34 0.46
90/91 0.93 0.45 1.44 0.16 0.93 0.36 1.18 0.14 1.03 0.19 6.01 0.43 0.96 0.45 1.67 0.16
91/92 1.06 0.43 1.90 0.18 1.00 0.55 1.51 0.16 1.06 0.17 2.64 0.28 1.05 0.54 1.79 0.17
92/93 1.12 0.68 2.12 0.22 1.17 0.30 9.87 0.96 1.11 0.67 2.70 0.22 1.11 0.59 2.16 0.22
93/94 1.07 0.39 2.02 0.20 1.17 0.15 3.81 0.52 1.10 0.53 1.56 0.17 1.12 0.57 3.24 0.27
80/94 1.84 0.30 6.31 0.87 1.65 0.46 5.64 0.91 2.10 0.31 49.96 5.04 2.18 0.17 13.18 2.0121
Table 3 Efficiency Change in SOEs (1980-94)
Machinery Industry Textile Industry Heavy Industries Light Industries
Year Mean Min Max Std Mean Min Max Std Mean Min Max Std Mean Min Max Std
80/81 0.87 0.23 1.60 0.24 0.91 0.62 1.27 0.15 0.89 0.07 7.89 0.65 0.95 0.08 2.37 0.28
81/82 0.98 0.33 4.04 0.41 0.93 0.16 1.40 0.19 1.01 0.54 2.80 0.29 0.99 0.39 2.17 0.22
82/83 1.06 0.46 2.00 0.24 0.28 0.13 1.33 0.17 1.01 0.25 2.13 0.18 1.02 0.38 6.33 0.48
83/84 0.98 0.40 1.85 0.22 1.01 0.15 1.96 0.25 0.98 0.62 3.69 0.25 0.99 0.39 2.21 0.21
84/85 0.94 0.41 2.11 0.20 0.96 0.58 1.58 0.17 0.97 0.18 2.46 0.22 1.00 0.48 1.89 0.20
85/86 0.99 0.49 3.12 0.27 0.93 0.36 2.01 0.22 1.01 0.20 5.38 0.39 0.95 0.45 1.71 0.16
86/87 1.05 0.46 2.60 0.26 0.99 0.35 1.57 0.18 0.97 0.36 1.54 0.15 0.83 0.26 1.39 0.24
87/88 0.98 0.40 1.81 0.21 0.92 0.32 1.71 0.23 0.97 0.51 3.86 0.27 1.06 0.54 4.20 0.37
88/89 0.98 0.29 1.74 0.21 0.84 0.22 1.42 0.21 0.95 0.11 1.52 0.18 0.95 0.47 1.70 0.19
89/90 1.08 0.43 3.13 0.46 1.10 0.21 4.30 0.65 1.06 0.42 4.46 0.51 1.03 0.42 2.50 0.36
90/91 0.93 0.45 1.44 0.16 0.92 0.36 1.18 0.14 0.82 0.15 1.70 0.28 0.91 0.43 1.67 0.16
91/92 0.89 0.42 1.71 0.16 0.92 0.50 1.42 0.15 1.01 0.17 2.58 0.26 0.94 0.52 1.47 0.13
92/93 0.94 0.49 1.88 0.18 0.31 0.06 1.02 0.19 0.97 0.55 2.44 0.17 0.94 0.47 1.78 0.18
93/94 1.01 0.32 1.64 0.18 1.12 0.15 3.60 0.44 0.99 0.46 1.46 0.14 0.96 0.48 2.52 0.21
80/94 1.08 0.20 4.42 0.55 0.95 0.23 1.90 0.37 1.78 0.30 49.75 4.89 1.50 0.12 12.66 1.70
Table 4 Technical Progress in SOEs (1980-94)
Machinery Industry Textile Industry Heavy Industries Light Industries
Year Mean Min Max Std Mean Min Max Std Mean Min Max Std Mean Min Max Std
80/81 1.08 1.00 1.28 0.07 1.15 1.00 1.29 0.09 1.33 1.00 4.25 0.79 1.06 1.00 1.76 0.12
81/82 1.16 1.00 1.48 0.09 1.04 1.00 1.12 0.04 1.05 1.00 1.33 0.06 1.09 1.00 1.86 0.13
82/83 1.07 1.00 1.29 0.08 4.71 2.05 9.70 1.27 1.10 1.00 2.44 0.13 1.14 1.00 2.72 0.19
83/84 1.18 1.01 1.67 0.12 1.02 1.00 1.23 0.03 1.08 1.00 1.50 0.09 1.20 1.00 8.66 0.63
84/85 1.18 1.00 1.29 0.07 1.06 1.00 1.20 0.05 1.07 1.00 1.44 0.06 1.10 1.00 1.85 0.10
85/86 1.07 1.00 1.16 0.05 1.06 1.00 1.46 0.06 1.11 1.00 2.61 0.19 1.10 1.00 2.05 0.12
86/87 1.05 1.00 1.15 0.03 1.05 1.00 1.44 0.06 1.09 1.00 2.01 0.12 1.53 1.00 4.20 0.76
87/88 1.13 1.00 1.57 0.09 1.04 1.00 1.15 0.04 1.16 1.00 1.90 0.19 1.10 1.00 4.12 0.25
88/89 1.06 1.00 1.42 0.04 1.12 1.00 1.94 0.18 1.07 1.00 1.71 0.11 1.16 1.00 3.73 0.29
89/90 1.04 1.00 1.31 0.05 1.11 1.00 2.54 0.20 1.07 1.00 1.57 0.12 1.16 1.00 2.13 0.18
90/91 1.01 1.00 1.15 0.02 1.01 1.00 1.13 0.02 1.53 1.00 6.01 1.04 1.06 1.00 1.44 0.08
91/92 1.20 1.00 1.60 0.12 1.09 1.00 1.44 0.09 1.05 1.00 1.52 0.08 1.12 1.00 1.79 0.14
92/93 1.20 1.03 2.26 0.14 4.59 1.14 9.87 2.01 1.15 1.01 1.82 0.12 1.20 1.00 1.98 0.21
93/94 1.06 1.00 1.29 0.07 1.04 1.00 1.87 0.10 1.12 1.00 1.45 0.09 1.18 1.00 2.33 0.19
80/94 1.72 1.19 2.44 0.25 1.72 1.16 3.28 0.41 1.24 1.00 2.66 0.28 1.67 1.00 5.83 0.9622
Table 5 Number of Best Practice and Its Proportions by Scale (1980-1994)
Large SOEs Medium SOEs Small SOEs Year
Total Best Share Total Best Share Total Best Share
1980 169 19 0.1124 371 48 0.1294 229 27 0.1179
1981 169 22 0.1302 371 63 0.1698 229 31 0.1354
1982 169 27 0.1598 371 61 0.1644 229 32 0.1397
1983 169 28 0.1657 371 49 0.1321 229 33 0.1441
1984 169 28 0.1657 371 56 0.1509 229 37 0.1616
1985 169 31 0.1834 371 53 0.1429 229 44 0.1921
1986 169 30 0.1775 371 62 0.1671 229 48 0.2096
1987 169 26 0.1539 371 54 0.1456 229 41 0.1790
1988 169 28 0.1657 371 57 0.1536 229 45 0.1965
1989 169 30 0.1775 371 64 0.1725 229 49 0.2140
1990 157 38 0.2420 342 87 0.2544 168 54 0.3214
1991 157 29 0.1847 342 70 0.2047 168 42 0.2500
1992 157 37 0.2357 342 75 0.2193 168 45 0.2679
1993 157 35 0.2229 342 63 0.1842 168 40 0.2381
1994 157 30 0.1911 342 52 0.1521 168 31 0.1845
Table 6 Number of Best Practice and Its Proportions by Administration (1980-1994)
Ministry Province Region County Year
Total Best Share Total Best Share Total Best Share Total Best Share
1980 66 4 0.06 76 5 0.07 546 75 0.14 69 8 0.12
1981 66 4 0.06 76 7 0.09 546 90 0.16 69 12 0.17
1982 66 6 0.09 76 8 0.11 546 94 0.17 69 11 0.16
1983 66 5 0.08 76 6 0.08 546 86 0.16 69 11 0.16
1984 66 3 0.05 76 6 0.08 546 99 0.18 69 10 0.14
1985 66 5 0.08 76 7 0.09 546 102 0.19 69 10 0.14
1986 66 5 0.08 76 9 0.12 546 107 0.20 69 16 0.23
1987 66 4 0.06 76 6 0.08 546 94 0.17 69 14 0.20
1988 66 5 0.08 76 6 0.08 546 101 0.18 69 15 0.22
1989 66 5 0.08 76 11 0.14 546 103 0.19 69 20 0.29
1990 58 11 0.19 75 18 0.24 493 139 0.28 49 13 0.27
1991 58 9 0.16 75 16 0.21 493 112 0.23 49 5 0.10
1992 58 10 0.17 75 19 0.25 493 124 0.25 49 6 0.12
1993 58 8 0.14 75 18 0.24 493 109 0.22 49 6 0.12
1994 58 5 0.09 75 11 0.15 493 95 0.19 49 4 0.08
Table 7 Number of Best Practice and Its Proportions by Province (1980-1994)
Jiangsu Jilin Shanxi Sichun Year
Total Best Share Total Best Share Total Best Share Total Best Share
1980 212 38 0.18 157 13 0.08 196 15 0.08 204 28 0.14
1981 212 45 0.21 157 21 0.13 196 18 0.09 204 32 0.16
1982 212 49 0.23 157 19 0.12 196 20 0.10 204 32 0.16
1983 212 39 0.18 157 20 0.13 196 19 0.10 204 32 0.16
1984 212 42 0.20 157 19 0.12 196 24 0.12 204 36 0.18
1985 212 47 0.22 157 25 0.16 196 22 0.11 204 34 0.17
1986 212 56 0.26 157 25 0.16 196 25 0.13 204 34 0.17
1987 212 46 0.22 157 23 0.15 196 26 0.13 204 26 0.13
1988 212 46 0.22 157 24 0.15 196 26 0.13 204 34 0.17
1989 212 51 0.24 157 31 0.20 196 29 0.15 204 32 0.16
1990 209 74 0.35 144 36 0.25 139 32 0.23 189 41 0.22
1991 209 57 0.27 144 28 0.19 139 25 0.18 189 34 0.18
1992 209 64 0.31 144 29 0.20 139 29 0.21 189 39 0.21
1993 209 60 0.29 144 23 0.16 139 26 0.19 189 33 0.17
1994 209 61 0.29 144 20 0.14 139 17 0.12 189 18 0.1023
Table 8 Proportion of High School Graduates or above in Total Employment by Scale
  and Proportion of Flexible Wage in Total Salary by Scale (1980-1994)
High School Graduate or above Flexible Wage
Scale Year Obs Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
80 169 0.307 0.004 0.837 0.315 0.000 1.000
81 169 0.313 0.009 0.827 0.338 0.000 1.000
82 169 0.310 0.007 0.795 0.358 0.000 1.000
83 169 0.326 0.008 0.815 0.386 0.138 1.000
84 169 0.340 0.023 0.834 0.429 0.175 1.000
85 169 0.343 0.024 0.796 0.405 0.100 1.000
86 169 0.357 0.028 0.803 0.412 0.094 1.000
87 169 0.371 0.028 0.695 0.466 0.157 1.000
88 169 0.387 0.027 0.787 0.507 0.262 1.000
89 169 0.405 0.027 0.801 0.517 0.229 1.000
90 157 0.405 0.040 0.932 0.373 0.000 0.764
91 157 0.412 0.043 0.932 0.350 0.000 0.696
92 157 0.417 0.045 0.933 0.333 0.000 0.672
93 157 0.425 0.049 0.932 0.314 0.000 0.679
Large
Scale
94 157 0.438 0.050 0.932 0.295 0.000 0.740
80 371 0.280 0.000 1.093 0.315 0.000 1.000
81 371 0.285 0.000 0.996 0.334 0.021 1.000
82 371 0.304 0.000 3.089 0.365 0.040 1.000
83 371 0.301 0.000 1.048 0.365 0.000 1.000
84 371 0.316 0.000 1.042 0.412 0.024 1.000
85 371 0.333 0.000 1.265 0.393 0.102 1.000
86 371 0.336 0.000 0.966 0.393 0.100 1.000
87 371 0.349 0.000 1.240 0.420 0.084 1.000
88 371 0.366 0.000 1.002 0.488 0.000 1.000
89 371 0.375 0.000 1.080 0.506 0.182 1.000
90 342 0.380 0.009 0.904 0.368 0.000 0.939
91 342 0.388 0.013 0.882 0.346 0.000 0.958
92 342 0.396 0.019 0.953 0.327 0.000 0.992
93 342 0.407 0.024 0.960 0.306 0.000 0.941
Medium
Scale
94 342 0.418 0.023 0.993 0.287 0.000 0.921
80 229 0.250 0.020 1.828 0.288 0.060 1.000
81 229 0.233 0.023 0.875 0.306 0.048 1.000
82 229 0.246 0.021 0.993 0.336 -0.019 1.000
83 229 0.282 0.021 4.168 0.347 0.015 1.000
84 229 0.269 0.013 1.066 0.387 0.063 1.000
85 229 0.278 0.018 1.124 0.367 0.091 0.949
86 229 0.286 0.025 1.117 0.372 0.060 1.000
87 229 0.294 0.023 0.973 0.397 0.056 1.000
88 229 0.309 0.000 1.340 0.473 0.053 1.000
89 229 0.337 0.031 4.938 0.487 0.065 1.000
90 168 0.353 0.022 0.920 0.348 0.000 0.765
91 168 0.363 0.033 0.933 0.327 0.000 0.938
92 168 0.374 0.041 0.886 0.309 0.000 0.943
93 168 0.383 0.051 0.922 0.285 0.000 0.936
Small
Scale
94 168 0.399 0.050 0.970 0.275 0.000 0.94524
Table 9 Proportion of High School Graduates or above in Total Employment and
  Proportion of Flexible Wage in Total Salary by Efficiency Interval (1980-1994)
High School Graduate or above Flexible Wage
Scale Year Obs Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
80 94 0.242 0.020 0.712 0.290 0.058 0.603
81 116 0.247 0.020 0.815 0.315 0.031 0.914
82 120 0.296 0.018 0.887 0.351 0.006 0.975
83 110 0.312 0.021 0.894 0.369 0.098 1.000
84 121 0.314 0.000 0.910 0.413 0.131 1.000
85 128 0.333 0.018 0.907 0.394 0.167 1.000
86 140 0.336 0.027 0.881 0.393 0.083 1.000
87 121 0.328 0.058 0.689 0.444 0.079 1.000
88 130 0.363 0.000 0.812 0.487 0.053 1.000
89 143 0.366 0.000 0.801 0.498 0.065 1.000
90 179 0.367 0.022 0.932 0.380 0.010 0.939
91 141 0.376 0.033 0.932 0.374 0.035 0.958
92 157 0.370 0.037 0.933 0.342 0.033 0.992
93 138 0.395 0.051 0.932 0.321 0.000 0.936
Best
Practice
94 113 0.393 0.072 0.970 0.287 0.000 0.639
80 234 0.268 0.000 1.000 0.310 0.000 1.000
81 267 0.287 0.000 0.995 0.331 0.000 0.990
82 310 0.278 0.000 0.993 0.367 0.040 1.000
83 275 0.296 0.000 1.048 0.356 0.075 1.000
84 307 0.310 0.000 0.972 0.411 0.024 1.000
85 298 0.317 0.000 1.265 0.389 0.098 1.000
86 281 0.320 0.000 0.940 0.393 0.060 1.000
87 279 0.343 0.000 1.240 0.423 0.071 1.000
88 301 0.356 0.000 1.340 0.490 0.115 1.000
89 275 0.388 0.000 4.938 0.494 0.131 1.000
90 342 0.374 0.009 0.925 0.360 0.000 0.932
91 351 0.390 0.013 0.933 0.336 0.000 0.908
92 331 0.398 0.019 0.953 0.314 0.000 0.806
93 266 0.424 0.024 0.960 0.294 0.000 0.941
0.5-0.99
94 316 0.420 0.023 0.993 0.284 0.000 0.945
80 112 0.268 0.000 0.871 0.301 0.000 1.000
81 155 0.258 0.000 0.875 0.312 0.154 1.000
82 133 0.259 0.000 0.880 0.337 0.000 1.000
83 186 0.296 0.000 4.168 0.381 0.071 1.000
84 169 0.275 0.000 1.018 0.411 0.063 1.000
85 179 0.295 0.000 1.025 0.376 0.091 1.000
86 190 0.309 0.000 0.893 0.374 0.121 1.000
87 213 0.322 0.000 0.898 0.406 0.056 1.000
88 178 0.325 0.000 0.884 0.475 0.000 1.000
89 198 0.332 0.000 0.918 0.506 0.183 1.000
90 50 0.377 0.025 0.904 0.313 0.000 0.893
91 83 0.350 0.026 0.877 0.298 0.000 0.951
92 84 0.383 0.051 0.907 0.313 0.000 0.942
93 170 0.358 0.071 0.929 0.293 0.000 0.870
0.0-0.49
94 146 0.402 0.050 0.871 0.281 0.000 0.73925
Table 10 Determinants of Technical Efficiency
Dependent variable E3 Dependent variable E3
*
Tobit model Tobit model (Random effects) Probit model
Variable  Coefficient P-value  Coefficient P-value  Coefficient P-value
Constant 0.6640 0.0000 0.5612 0 -1.3385 0
AGE 0.0010 0.0001 0.000892 0.0212 0.0026 0.3364
WP 0.1161 0.0000 0.0666 0 0.6538 0.0025
ED 0.1004 0.0001 0.0886 0 0.6716 0.0081
KG -0.0002 0.7260 0.00005 0.9612 -0.0029 0.4546
PROV1 0.1299 0.0000 0.112654 0 0.8138 0
PROV2 -0.0304 0.0026 -0.0139 0.3053 -0.1666 0.1025
PROV3 -0.0319 0.0013 0.00211 0.8704 -0.0338 0.7453
S1 0.0085 0.4369 -0.00347 0.7508 0.2435 0.0172
S2 -0.0270 0.0012 -0.0382 0 -0.2379 0.003
ADM1 -0.0914 0.0000 -0.0169 0.4272 -0.6254 0.0009
ADM2 -0.0431 0.0100 0.0547 0.0015 -0.3313 0.0457
ADM3 -0.0190 0.1419 0.0469 0.0006 -0.1483 0.2531
Y81 -0.0130 0.5564 -0.0127 0.4266 0.2498 0.256
Y82 0.0104 0.6341 0.00941 0.5963 0.1914 0.3811
Y83 -0.0614 0.0043 -0.0572 0 -0.0332 0.8805
Y84 -0.0245 0.2518 -0.0167 0.3184 -0.1219 0.5789
Y85 -0.0293 0.1630 -0.0251 0.1338 0.0297 0.889
Y86 -0.0430 0.0408 -0.0383 0.0288 0.0698 0.7421
Y87 -0.0838 0.0001 -0.0705 0 -0.2380 0.2731
Y88 -0.0588 0.0057 -0.0508 0.0056 0.0001 0.9996
Y89 -0.0651 0.0022 -0.0545 0.0003 0.0013 0.9951
Y90 0.1301 0.0000 0.100087 0 0.7822 0.0001
Y91 0.0777 0.0002 0.0629 0 0.3790 0.064
Y92 0.0881 0.0000 0.0661 0.0001 0.5721 0.0048
Y93 -0.0259 0.2063 -0.0342 0.0107 0.3755 0.0673
Y94 -0.0095 0.6438 -0.0118 0.4399 0.0701 0.7379
sigma (v) 0.166866 0
sigma(u) 0.13228 0
(This table is subject to an error with education variable between 1990-94, but Tables 11 and 12 used the
corrected one. However, this error shall not dramatically change the conclusion according to our experience.)
AGE  ―   Age of the enterprise;   WP — Flexible wage;  ED — Education; KG — Capacity utilization; PROV
— Province. 1, Jiangsu; 2, Jilin; 3, Shanxi; and 4, Sichuan.
S — Scale of the enterprise. 1, large; 2, medium; and 3, small.
ADM — Administration level. 1, central and ministry; 2, provincial; 3, region; 4, county.26
Table 11 Determinants of Productivity Growth, Efficiency Change, and Technical Progress
Productivity Growth Efficiency Change Technical Progress
OLS method OLS method Tobit model
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Constant 1.0134 0.0001 0.9480 0.0001 -0.2401 0.4536
DWP 0.1145 0.0059 0.0829 0.0142 0.2965 0.3957
DED 0.2466 0.0024 0.2407 0.0003 0.6478 0.1768
DKG -0.0004 0.7509 -0.0002 0.8192 -0.00583 0.8318
PROV1 0.0311 0.0095 0.0237 0.015 0.2551 0.0254
PROV2 0.0155 0.2575 0.0110 0.3208 0.0618 0.6338
PROV3 0.0325 0.0156 0.0170 0.1202 0.0218 0.8621
S1 0.0086 0.55 0.0101 0.3898 0.2547 0.0622
S2 -0.0112 0.3123 -0.0070 0.4387 0.1361 0.1782
ADM1 -0.0037 0.8796 -0.0072 0.718 -0.1159 0.6216
ADM2 0.0067 0.7687 0.0013 0.9434 -0.0717 0.7334
ADM3 -0.0009 0.9606 -0.0065 0.646 0.0193 0.9024
Y82 0.0688 0.016 0.0929 0.0001 0.9136 0.0001
Y83 0.1162 0.0001 0.0077 0.7373 2.6449 0.0001
Y84 0.0808 0.0036 0.0980 0.0001 1.5325 0.0001
Y85 0.0421 0.1261 0.0653 0.0035 2.2018 0.0001
Y86 0.0471 0.0817 0.0824 0.0002 2.2525 0.0001
Y87 0.0707 0.0088 0.0572 0.0091 2.1054 0.0001
Y88 0.0866 0.0012 0.0929 0.0001 2.0409 0.0001
Y89 0.0088 0.7403 0.0400 0.0653 1.4696 0.0001
Y90 0.1535 0.0001 0.1700 0.0001 0.0602 0.734
Y91 -0.0445 0.0789 -0.0093 0.6507 -0.1901 0.2207
Y92 0.0370 0.1429 0.0530 0.0099 1.3859 0.0001
Y93 0.1080 0.0001 -0.0461 0.025 3.7264 0.0001
Y94 0.0941 0.0002 0.1074 0.0001 2.0832 0.000127
Table 12 Probability of Productivity Growth, Efficiency Change, and Technical progress
Logit Model Results
Dependent variable Mo




Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Constant -0.4411 0.0782 -1.0876 0.0001 -0.2401 0.4536
DWP 0.7827 0.0017 0.5769 0.0263 0.2965 0.3957
DED 0.8078 0.0595 0.5205 0.2468 0.6478 0.1768
DKG -0.0196 0.6363 -0.0207 0.4761 -0.00583 0.8318
PROV1 0.3684 0.0001 0.0546 0.4832 0.2551 0.0254
PROV2 0.0887 0.286 0.0169 0.8494 0.0618 0.6338
PROV3 -0.00721 0.9294 0.0598 0.4863 0.0218 0.8621
S1 0.1837 0.0377 -0.0825 0.3781 0.2547 0.0622
S2 0.0149 0.8241 0.00216 0.976 0.1361 0.1782
ADM1 0.0515 0.7316 0.1174 0.4526 -0.1159 0.6216
ADM2 0.1704 0.2188 -0.0179 0.9026 -0.0717 0.7334
ADM3 0.0294 0.78 -0.1126 0.3145 0.0193 0.9024
Y82 0.4356 0.0078 0.1487 0.4109 0.9136 0.0001
Y83 1.2646 0.0001 0.4794 0.006 2.6449 0.0001
Y84 0.8918 0.0001 0.4028 0.0195 1.5325 0.0001
Y85 0.664 0.0001 0.1515 0.3859 2.2018 0.0001
Y86 0.4549 0.0034 0.0682 0.6943 2.2525 0.0001
Y87 0.8919 0.0001 0.3154 0.0627 2.1054 0.0001
Y88 0.7183 0.0001 0.4697 0.0049 2.0409 0.0001
Y89 0.3666 0.0168 0.1418 0.4042 1.4696 0.0001
Y90 0.3221 0.0432 0.6062 0.0004 0.0602 0.734
Y91 -0.1779 0.2221 -0.4952 0.0038 -0.1901 0.2207
Y92 0.6717 0.0001 -0.039 0.8109 1.3859 0.0001
Y93 1.3197 0.0001 -0.3813 0.0238 3.7264 0.0001
Y94 1.2064 0.0001 0.4966 0.0017 2.0832 0.000128
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 The SOE share in China’s total industrial output has declined from 77.6 percent in 1978 to 28.8
percent in 1996. However, in 1996 SOE’s still employed 57.4 percent of urban workers and possessed
52.2 percent of total investment in industrial fixed assets (Lin, et. al, 1998).
2 Once the powerhouse behind the economy’s growth and employment, the dynamism of China’s 1.5
million collectively owned enterprises has waned. After generating some 17 million jobs in 1993, they
created just 1.4 million in 1994 and 1995, while private and individually owned enterprises created
6.6 million new jobs (World Bank, 1997).
3 A new industrial policy announced on March 25, 1994 emphasised the development of “pillar”
industries. Five pillar industries have been designated by the government: machinery, electronics,
petrochemicals, automobiles, and construction. These industries were chosen because they are
expected to face a high income elasticity of demand, enjoy substantial economies of scale, result in
significant backward and forward production linkages, possess potential for high productivity growth,
and reflect China’s comparative advantage. The hope is that they will eventually account for 5 percent
of GDP (or 8 percent of industrial output), increase their share in international markets, reach
international quality standards quickly, and become profitable (World Bank, 1997, page 39).
4 Widely cited studies using aggregate time series data include: Chen et. al (1988), Jefferson et. al
(1994 and 1996), Jefferson and Singh (1993), Rawski (1986), Woo et. al (1994), and Wu (1993);
while Parker (1997), Li (1997), and Wu (1996) are examples of studies in which enterprise data
were used.
5 Since we assume constant returns to scale, the deference between their output increasing and input
saving efficiency disappears.
6 The evidence is that if one divides the output in current price (in 1980 or 1990) by the output in
fixed price (1980, or 1990 price), most results give values other than unity.
7 The proportion of high school graduates or above in total employment and the proportion of flexible
wage in total salary is shown by scale and year in Table 8 and by efficiency interval and year in Table
9.
8 Results in Table 10 were produced using a recent version of LIMDEP. Tables 11 and 12 were
obtained using SAS. Probit models were estimated by the Proc Logistic procedure.